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COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
THIRD CIRCUIT
Raymond Proffitt Found. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 343
F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Congress granted the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers broad discretion for implementing the Water
Resources Development Act's environmental protection mission at
specific water projects).
The Raymond Proffitt Foundation and the Lehigh River Stocking
Association (collectively the "Foundation") sued the United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") in the United States District Court
for Eastern District of Pennsylvania, claiming the Corps violated the
Water Resources Development Act of 1990 ("WRDA").
The
Foundation alleged the WRDA required the Corps to release
additional flows from the Walter Dam in order to improve the aquatic
environment downstream. The Corps asserted the WRDA's subject
provisions were discretionary, committed to the agency by law, and
unreviewable under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). The
district court concluded there was no "law to apply" to the facts and,
therefore, the Corps' actions were not subject to judicial review under
the APA. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed and
held the WRDA contained specific obligatory provisions and the
Corps' actions were subject to judicial review. Nevertheless, the court
of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment,
stating the Corps' actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or in violation
of the law.
The Foundation consisted of members who recreated (including
fishing, hunting, boating and rafting) on the Lehigh River
downstream of the Walter Dam in Northeastern Pennsylvania. The
Corps operated the Walter Dam by replicating the natural
hydrograph-flows that would naturally occur if the dam was not
present-of the river. In order for the anglers, canoeists, and rafters
to have better recreating opportunities, the Foundation wanted the
Corps to augment the low summer flows by releasing additional water
and asserted the WRDA required the Corps to do so.

Issue I

COURTREPORTS

The court of appeals first evaluated whether the Foundation's
allegations were subject to judicial review. The Foundation's first
claim-that the Corps failed to take action to include environmental
protections as one of their "missions" at the dam-was subject to
judicial review because the WRDA imposed an affirmative obligation
on the Corps to include these protections as a "primary mission."
Specifically, the statute stated the Corps' objectives "shall include
environmental protections." Due to this mandatory language, the
court of appeals disagreed with the district court and held that there
was specific law to apply to the facts, thus the claim was subject to
judicial review.
The second claim-that the Corps was not fulfilling its mission of
environmental protection at the dam-was also subject to judicial
review because no clear and convincing evidence existed that the
Foundation's interpretation of the WRDA was contrary to legislative
intent. The Foundation construed the WRDA as prohibiting the Corps
from implementing any policies causing harm to aquatic life. The
court determined this colorable interpretation was not clearly contrary
to legislative intent, hence the claim was also reviewable.
After concluding the Foundation's claims were reviewable, the
court analyzed the validity of each claim. It was undisputed that the
WRDA required the inclusion of environmental protections as a
"primary mission" of the Corps; however, the court stated it was within
the Corps' discretion to determine the appropriate level of
environmental protections for each specific water project. Applying
these principles, the court found that the Corps had in fact included
environmental protections as one of their missions, both at the overall
Corps level and specifically at Walter Dam. In 1996, the Corps revised
its environmental restoration and protection policies in response to
the WRDA. In 1994, the Corps' Walter Reservoir Water Control
Manual described environmental protections for the Walter Dam. The
court concluded that even though the primary objective of the Walter
Dam remained flood control, the Corps' 1996 and 1994 actions were
evidence of the Corps' intent to include environmental protection as a
primary mission. The court of appeals held that these measures
satisfied the minimum action required of the agency under the APA.
Lastly, the court concluded that the Corps did not violate the
WRDA by refusing to operate the dam in the manner requested by the
Foundation. Under the APA, a reviewing court can set aside an agency
action as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with the law unless the agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law. The WRDA vested broad discretion with the
Corps; therefore, the court held that the agency's decision to
reproduce the natural hydrograph did not violate the APA.
Overall, the appellate court concluded the WRDA included
specific laws for the judiciary to apply, the Corps complied with those
laws by taking actions to facilitate the implementation of
environmental protections, and lastly, the Corps had broad discretion
for determining the type of environmental protection at each water
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project. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment for reasons different than those offered by the
district court.
Lisa M. Thompson

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Am. Canoe Ass'n, Inc. v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505 (4th Cir.
2003) (holding that plaintiffs bringing a citizen suit under the Clean
Water Act satisfied the injury in fact and traceability requirements for
Article III standing by showing (1) concerns regarding water quality
affecting their recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests; (2)
testimony that a defendant discharged pollutants within the specific
geographic area of concern; and (3) evidence the pollutant was
capable of causing kind the of injuries plaintiffs alleged).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision addressed whether
Canoe Association, Professional Paddlesports
the American
Association, and Conservation Council of North Carolina
("Environmental Groups") had standing to sue two jointly operating
North Carolina hog farms in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina under the Clean Water Act's
("CWA") citizen suit provision. Specifically, the Environmental
Groups claimed that D.M. Farms of Rose Hill LLC and Murphy Farms
Inc. ("Hog Farmers") violated the CWA by discharging swine waste
into Six Runs Creek without a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. Prior to this suit, the Hog
Farmers operated under a North Carolina Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Animal Waste Management Plan
("State Plan") that prohibited animal waste discharges to surface
waters. As a result, the Hog Farmers had not applied for an NPDES
permit. However, on two occasions while operating under the State
Plan, the Hog Farmers discharged animal waste into waters of the
United States without an NPDES permit.
The Environmental Groups sued the Hog Farmers for failing to
obtain an NPDES permit and for discharging waste without an NPDES
permit. The district court granted the Environmental Groups' motion
for preliminary injunction, thereby requiring the Hog Farmers to
apply for an NPDES permit. The district court also granted partial
summary judgment to the Environmental Groups on the claims that
the discharges violated the CWA. The Hog Farmers appealed. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded the
preliminary injunction issue to the district court for a mootness
inquiry and declined to review the partial summaryjudgment ruling.
On remand, both parties entered into a consent decree,
contingent on the Environmental Groups prevailing over the Hog

